University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 31
Number 2 Spring 2001

Article 7

2001

Recent Developments: Temporary Staffing, Inc. v.
J.J. Haines & Co.: Employer's Obligation to Pay
Workers' Compensation Claims Is Determined by
Contract between Temporary Staffing Agency and
Employer
Scott H. Amey

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Amey, Scott H. (2001) "Recent Developments: Temporary Staffing, Inc. v. J.J. Haines & Co.: Employer's Obligation to Pay Workers'
Compensation Claims Is Determined by Contract between Temporary Staffing Agency and Employer," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 31 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol31/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Temporary Staffing, Inc. v. J.J. Haines & Co.:
Employer's Obligation to Pay Workers' Compensation Claims is Determined by
Contract Between Temporary Staffing Agency and Employer
By Scott H. Arney

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held contracts or
agreements between a temporary
staffing agency and an employee's
assigned company determine
obligations to pay workers'
compensation claims. Temporary
Staffing v. J.J. Haines & Co., 362
Md. 388,765 A.2d 602 (2001). In
so holding, the court expanded the
Workers' Compensation Commission's jurisdiction to determine the
specific employer accountable for an
employee's injuries. To perform
such an obligation, the Workers'
Compensation Commission must
consider any agreements between
the co-employers. Accordingly, all
aspects of a workers' compensation claim will be decided in
one proceeding.
On December 31, 1992,
Mark A. Jewell ("Jewell") was
injured while working atJ.J. Haines
& Co., Inc. ("J.J. Haines") when a
tractor trailer backed into him.
Temporary Staffing, Inc. {"TSI")
sent Jewell to work at J.J. Haines,
pursuant to an agreement signed
between the two employers.
According to literature provided by
TSI to J.J. Haines, TSI accepted
responsibility for workers'
compensation insurance. In
addition, TSI billed J.J. Haines
$8 7 5 per hour and in turn, TSI paid

Jewell $5.60 per hour.
On January 22, 1993, Jewell
filed a claim with the Maryland
Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"). The
Commission determined that J.J.
Haines was the employer and its
insurance company was liable for
Jewell's injuries.
J.J. Haines petitioned for
judicial review in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County. The
circuit court found that J.J. Haines
and TSI were co-employers,
reversed the Commission's
decision, and remanded the case to
the Commission. On remand, the
Commission, without considering
the agreement between the parties,
found Jewell to have a temporary
total disability and permanent
partial disability. Both employers
were ordered to pay equal shares
of Jewell's claim.
Again, J.J. Haines sought
judicial review by the circuit court.
The court found TSI was "primarily
liable forpaymentofany award" to
Jewell. TSI filed a notice of appeal
to the court of special appeals. On
its own motion, the court of appeals
granted certiorari to determine
whether the trial court erred in
finding: 1) TSI was primarily liable
for Jewell's award; 2) J.J. Haines
was liable for any award in excess
of TSI's coverage and 3) Jewell

was an employee ofTSI, rather than
of both employers.
The court first examined the
intent of the Maryland Workers'
Compensation Act ("Act') and the
establishment of the Commission.
Id. at 397, 765 A.2d at 606. The
court further cited numerous
holdings that detailed the
longstanding intention to balance
the needs of injured employees
versus the burden on employers
and the public to finance such
compensation systems. Id. (citing
Polomski v. Mayor & City
Council ofBait., 344 Md. 70, 684
A.2d 1338 (1996)). The court
added that the purpose for the
establishment of the Commission
was to administer the workers'
compensation program. !d. at 398,
765 A.2d at 607. The creation of
the Commission was an effort to
provide "prompt relief to injured
workmen" and an appeal to a court
for any Commission decision if
there is a mistake oflaw or if the
Commission "acted arbitrarily."
Id. (quoting Egeberg v. Md. Steel
Prods. Co., 190 Md. 374, 58
A.2d 684 (1948)).
Next, the court found that
when a question arises as to the
liability of co-employers, "the
Commission out of necessity, must
determine the extent of each
respective employer's liability. In
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the performance of that duty, the
Commission, in order to fulfill its
obligation, must consider an
agreement between employers."
ld. at 399, 765 A.2d at 607. In
addition, the court recognized that
the jurisdiction of the Commission
included the, "authority to approve
claims, re-open cases, make
determinations on employment
relations, determine liability of
employers, award lump sum
payments, approve settlements,
award fees for legal services, funeral
expenses, and medical services."
ld. at 400, 765 A.2d at 608. Both
sides made arguments concerning
the terms of the contract as it existed
between the parties, however, the
Commission held that making such
a determination was beyond its
jurisdiction. ld.
Because this was a matter of
first impression in Maryland, the
court examined the law in other
states. !d. at 401, 7 65 A.2d at 609.
Courts in Minnesota, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma granted
jurisdiction to respective agencies to
interpret contracts between coemployers. /d. at 401-03, 765
A.2d at 609-10.
The court held that due to the
Commission's authority and the
intent of the Act, the Commission
has jurisdiction to interpret
agreements or contracts between
co-employers. ld. at 403-04, 765
A.2d at 610. Moreover, the court
held that a separate civil proceeding
contradicts the efficient and
economical intentions of the Act. /d.
at404, 765 A.2dat610. Thus, the
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circuit court, acting as a reviewing
court, cannot decide issues that
were not decided by the
Commission. Jd. at 404-05, 765
A.2d at 610-11. The court found
that the Commission erred in failing
to render a decision on TSI and J.J.
Haines' contract. /d. at 405, 765
A.2d at 611. Furthermore, the
circuit court was required to remand
the case back to the Commission
to determine the existence of the
contract between the parties and the
effect ofliability under the contract.
Id. at 405-06, 765 A.2d at 611.
After a detailed examination of
the intent of the Workers'
Compensation Commission Act, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
extended the Commission's power
to adjudicate all claims within the
same proceeding. Although
enabling legislation grants the
Commission express authority to
administer
the
workers'
compensation process, the court
streamlined the process, thus
altering the burden on the parties
and Commission. Therefore, parties
who do not raise contract
interpretation issues before the
Commission will be barred from
raising that issue in circuit court,
which will be required to remand the
case until the Commission interprets
the contract or agreement.

